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This study considers the role that reserve prices may play in residential property 
auctions. In comparison to much of the previous empirical work, this study has access 
to undisclosed reserve prices from English auctions. Consistent with theoretical 
arguments in the auction literature, the results obtained illustrate that whilst higher 
reserve prices increase the revenue obtained for the seller, they also reduce the 
probability of sale.  The findings also highlight the importance of auction 
participation, with the number of individual bidders and the number of bids 
significant in most specifications.   
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The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions 
 
1: Introduction 
The empirical analysis of auctions has frequently been constrained by data limitations. 
This is especially so with respect to undisclosed reserve prices. As a result, it has 
often been difficult to empirically consider some of the key theoretical arguments 
regarding the impact and role of reserve prices. Using a dataset that includes 
information on the undisclosed reserve prices, this paper examines residential 
property auctions in Dublin, Ireland. The Irish market provides an interesting case to 
consider the dynamics of the auction process. English open outcry auctions are the 
main alternative form of sale mechanism to private treaty negotiated sales in the Irish 
market. In common with markets such as Australia (Lusht, 1994, 1996), auctions tend 
to be used at the higher end of the market. In contrast, markets such as the United 
States are characterized by a large proportion of auctioned properties representing 
distressed sales (DeBoer et al., 1992; Mayer, 1998 and McAfee at al. 2002). This 
obviously leads to differences in terms of the motivation of the sellers concerned and 
is of particular importance in terms of the reserve estimates. 
 
The data set utilized in this study consists of 389 properties that were offered for sale 
through auction between 1998 and 2002. Importantly, this data includes information 
on variables often missing from existing empirical work, including the undisclosed 
reserve, the attendance at the auction, the number of bids and bidders and the 
individual auctioneer presiding. A key advantage in this dataset is that unlike many 
papers (e.g. Ong et al., 2005) we do not have to rely on proxies to capture the impact 
of different factors. In addition, due to the nature of the auction procedure followed in 
Ireland, we are largely considering willing sellers. Therefore, unlike papers such as 
DeBoer et al. (1992) and McAfee et al. (2002), our reserve estimate is based on 
perceived market value and not related to issues such as outstanding mortgage debt or 
unpaid tax. 
 
One of the key features of the current study is the examination of how the reserve 
price impacts upon both the price obtained and the probability of sale at auction. Riley 
& Samuelson (1981) illustrate that the imposition of a reserve will maximize revenue, 
a result that holds for either English or Dutch auctions. However, McAfee & Vincent 
(1992) argue that whilst reserves should have a positive relationship with the sale 
price obtained, they will have a negative impact with respect to the likelihood of sale. 
The rationale behind this is that, naturally, if the vendor imposes a higher minimum 
price then he/she is less likely to witness a bid of that magnitude, hence a reduced 
probability of sale. However, if that level is achieved, then it is likely that the 
proceeds from the sale will be enhanced. Riley & Samuelson (1981) also illustrate 
that the optimal reserve will be higher than the vendor’s own valuation and 
furthermore that it is independent of the number of bidders. They also note that under 
an assumption that all bidders share a common cardinal utility function, the optimal 
reserve price is a declining function of the risk aversion of the vendor. This point is 
also argued by Hu et al. (2010), under an assumption of symmetric and independent 
private values. It is intuitive that more risk averse sellers will place greater attention 
on the risk of not selling
1
.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly considers 
some of the pertinent literature while section 3 details the data and methodological 
framework used in the study. The final two sections present the main empirical 
findings and provide concluding comments respectively.  
 
2: Auction Literature  
Whilst several papers have illustrated the importance of the reserve price in a 
theoretical context (Riley & Samuelson, 1981; McAfee & Vincent, 1992; and Hu et 
al., 2010), little empirical research has considered the issue. This is true not only in 
the specific instance of real estate but also across the broad auction literature. Often 
this has been simply due to the fact that reserve prices have not been available (e.g. 
Dotzour, et al., 1998; Toda et al., 1998; Ong et al, 2005; Stevenson et al., 2010).  
Because of these limitations, some papers, such as Ong et al. (2005), have used 
proxies in order to try and capture the impact. In this case the authors use a measure 
they refer to as the level of reserve price. This measure was defined as the percentage 
difference of an estimate of the property’s market value relative to the opening bid2. 
Furthermore, many of the papers that have been able to access reserve data have 
analyzed forced or distressed sales. For example, although DeBoer et al. (1992) find 
that an increased reserve reduces the probability of sale, the data analyzed consists of 
properties in Indianapolis sold due to the nonpayment of tax. As such tax sales have 
the reserve set at a level equal to the tax owed in Indiana, this frequently results in a 
reserve substantially less than the market value of the property. The study of McAfee 
at al. (2002) encounters a similar issue in estimating the optimal reserve price. In their 
case, observations consist of distressed sales conducted on behalf of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Across 6 FDIC auctions, including a mix of 
open outcry and sealed bid, the sale price was, on average, 75% of the appraised 
value. In estimating the optimal reserve price they obtained an estimated lower bound 
also of 75%. Given that at least in the majority of cases the winning bidder needed to 
have bid in excess of the reserve, it illustrates the low levels of reserves used by the 
FDIC. The finding that the optimal reserve should be in excess of those currently 
observed is also found in non-real estate papers such as McAfee & Vincent (1992), 
Paarsch (1997) and Li et al. (2003). 
 
An additional issue in the literature concerns the disclosure of the reserve price. 
Vincent (1995) argues that in a common-value auction, the non-disclosure of the 
reserve can increase the price obtained. The rationale for this argument is that 
disclosing the reserve may lead to non-bidding as potential participants may be 
discouraged if the reserve was either above or equal to their potential maximum bid. 
The argument in favor of non-disclosure is based on the premise of encouraging a 
greater number of bidders. As Vincent (1995) argues, if they did not participate then 
the information that their bids would have revealed is lost. It is effectively the same 
arguments relating to the impact of an increased number of bidders as will be 
discussed shortly.  
 
Papers such as Eklof & Lunander (2003) do however argue in favor of disclosure of 
the reserve in their investigation of residential apartment auctions in Stockholm. 
Using private values, thus assuming a motive of consumption, and assuming that the 
number of bidders is exogenous and known, the evidence provided shows that a 
strategy of non-disclosure yields lower expected revenue. It is important to note, 
however, that during the sample period considered, the Stockholm market was 
experiencing a downturn. Furthermore, the properties considered were not generally 
in prime areas therefore reducing the possibility of price appreciation, in the form of 
common values playing a major role. Importantly, as the authors note, they only had 
access to information contained in the winning bid. This therefore excludes 
information contained in other bids which should also be an important element in 
common values. Furthermore, the assumption that the number of bidders is exogenous 
and known eliminates the possibility that the disclosure of the reserve may lead to a 
reduction in the number of bids (Vincent, 1995). Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) 
argue that revealing information about common value will increase revenue, as 
without this information there may be large degree of uncertainty regarding the value 
of the good/object. This uncertainty, added to by the infrequent nature of such 
auctions, leads to a loss of efficiency as less uncertainty being present will result in 
bidding being more aggressive. However, Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) also 
illustrate that revenue will increase with the number of bidders and that the effect of 
the number of bidders is stronger than the effect of revealing more information. 
Therefore, if revealing information through the disclosure of the reserve reduces 
participation, it may lead to an overall loss of efficiency
3
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The number of bidders has been a key component in the auction literature, particularly 
in those papers which have considered the likelihood of a successful auction sale. 
Whilst the role of the number of bidders in obtaining higher prices at auction is shown 
in papers such as Vickrey (1961), Holt (1979), Harris & Raviv (1981) and McAfee & 
McMillan (1987), empirical evidence for this is more thinly spread. Both non-
property papers (Saidi & Marsden, 1992; Chen et al., 2003) and those to have directly 
considered real estate (Ching & Fu, 2003; Ong et al., 2005; Ooi et al., 2006) have all 
found some form of evidence that the number of bidders significantly impacts, in a 
positive sense, upon either the price obtained or the probability of a sale being 
achieved. Ong (2006) finds that the number of bidders plays a significant role in the 
price obtained even in the case of properties that were initially withdrawn at auction 
and subsequently sold privately. Whilst not directly examining the number of bidders, 
Stevenson et al. (2010) found that the role of turnout and the need to encourage as 
many participants as possible does play a role in how price information is 
communicated before an auction.  Their findings illustrate that not only do auctioned 
properties sell at a premium compared to private sales, but that the listing price for 
auctioned properties is significantly lower than for properties sold privately. The 
authors argue that this may be attributed to agents using the advertised guide as a 
marketing tool where underpricing the auctioned properties may encourage a greater 
number of bidders to participate in the auction.  
 
The role of bidders can also be related to the issue of market conditions, as it is likely 
that auctions undertaken during stronger conditions will see a higher number of 
potential bidders. Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) explicitly argue that efficiency 
and therefore the revenue generated will be higher when more bidders enter the 
auction. Pesendorfer & Swinkels (2000) note that a large number of bidders can lead 
to a resumption of efficiency, even in the case of a two-signal auction. Mayer (1995) 
argues that an increase in bidders also increases the likelihood of the participation of 
high-value bidders. In an auction context, this could be viewed as those with higher 
private values of the property concerned. The recent work of Chow et al. (2011) also 
notes this, arguing that auctions will be the preferred sale mechanism in a case where 
bidders with higher valuations participate
4
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Although in a different context, Gilbert & Klemperer (2000) illustrate that it may be 
more profitable for a seller to ration output, thus selling at a fixed price level at which 
demand exceeds supply, rather than selling at a higher price that clears the market. 
The underlying rationale relates to the idea that the offering of a lower price acts as an 
incentive for more buyers to enter the market. In the context of this research the above 
rationale has direct relevance. It can also be related to the arguments of Glower et al. 
(1998) who note that vendors convey information about their desire to sell the 
property through the listing price that is set.  
 
The setting of the reserve price has parallels in the general housing literature in terms 
of listing prices. A number of papers have provided evidence that the setting of a 
guide price, in a private treaty context, has similar effects as with the reserve in an 
auction setting. Papers such as Haurin (1988), Mayer (1995) and Genesove & Mayer 
(1997) argue that there exists a trade-off resulting from the setting of the guide price
5
. 
A higher guide will increase possible revenue, but it will also reduce the speed of 
arrival of bids and therefore generally lead to an increase in the amount of time the 
property is on-the-market. Genesove & Mayer (1997) specifically illustrate this in the 
context of vendors with high loan-to-value ratios. Due to the need for increased 
revenue in order to comply with their mortgage financing obligations, they have a 
greater tendency to set a higher listing price. Merlo & Ortalo-Magne (2004) also 
illustrate that the setting of the listing price affects the arrival of bids and thus the 
time-on-market. The longer the time-on-the-market then there is a fall in the ‘arrival 
rate’ of bids. In addition, it also has the impact that the probability that the listing 
price is adjusted increases and that there is a negative effect on both the amount of 
offers and the sale price relative to the listing price. However, it does, increase the 
probability that a match is successful. In this sense the findings can be related back to 
Mayer (1995) and the general advantage of a negotiated sale, in that it removes the 
time constraints present in an auction. This therefore allows vendors more time to find 
a bidder who matches their valuation of the property. 
 
In a broader sense there is a major point of differentiation between list prices for 
private sales and list and reserve prices in an auction setting. As papers such as Haurin 
(1988), Horowitz (1992) and Yavas & Yang (1995) argue, private treaty guide prices 
indicate what the reservation price of the seller is and. more importantly they indicate 
an upper bound to that reservation price. Unless a vendor is in a situation where 
competing bidders are present at the same point in time, the listing price effectively 
precludes the possibility of selling the property at a higher price. Indeed, it would be 
relatively rare that the list price is exceeded in a negotiated sale. However, not only 
will the sale price in a successful auction generally exceed the guide, but the reserve 
can be exceeded. This impact may be enhanced in the context of a sample such as 
ours where the reserve is undisclosed. In the context of our sample, listing and reserve 
prices therefore no longer act as an upper bound.  
 
 
3: Data 
The data analyzed in this paper consists of a total of 389 residential properties that 
were offered for sale through auction. The properties were all located in the Greater 
Dublin metropolitan area of Ireland and the auction date for each property was 
between 1998 and 2002. The data was obtained from one of the largest 
auctioneers/estate agents in Dublin and includes all information contained in their 
auction book
6
. The sample includes properties that were successfully sold at auction 
(198) and properties that were withdrawn (191). For 239 of the properties we also 
have the undisclosed reserve price
7
. In addition to price data we also have information 
on the number of bids, number of bidders, the attendance at the auction, whether 
multiple auctions were held that day, the auctioneer who conducted the auction and 
the location of the final bidder in the auction room. With regard to the multiple 
auctions dummy it should be noted that when multiple auctions took place it did not 
necessarily mean that the properties were similar, or substitutable. In many instances 
the properties concerned display a wide range of characteristics in terms of property 
type, guide price, size and location. 
 
As is common in many countries, residential properties in Ireland may be sold either 
through private treaty or through auctions. In the case of properties sold through 
auction the form adopted is the first-price English open-outcry method. The decision 
as to the sale mechanism adopted is made by the vendor, in association with the agent, 
prior to marketing. It should be noted that not only are the agents involved with 
auction and private treaty sales the same firms, but that the agents act as the 
auctioneer for properties sold through that method. In terms of the choice of sale 
mechanism, certainly during the sample period considered in this paper, auctions were 
the sale method of choice by willing vendors of higher value properties. The extent of 
this can be seen in Stevenson et al. (2010) where over 60% of the properties in the 
highest value decile of their sample were sold through auction. Indeed, based on their 
sample it can also be seen that 43.66% of auctions were in the highest decile and 
78.95% in the top three deciles by price. Whilst the Irish market, in common with 
Australia and New Zealand, see auctions being the preferred sale method at the 
premium end of the market, in markets such as the United States (DeBoer et al., 1992; 
Mayer, 1998 and McAfee at al. 2002) and Singapore (Ong et al., 2005, Ong 2006) a 
large proportion of properties sold at auction are distressed sales.  
 
There is potential selectivity bias present in all studies of sale mechanisms in that the 
vendor’s decision as to the mechanism selected may be associated with missing price 
affecting variables. This may result in differences in prices being wrongly attributed 
to the sale mechanism adopted rather than the omitted variable. Given that we are 
solely considering properties sold through auction we avoid this issue directly. 
Stevenson et al. (2010) do consider the issue in the context of the Irish market and in 
their sample of privately sold and auctioned properties do not find evidence of 
selectivity bias.  
 
Auction sales generally proceed through a relatively fixed process with a three to four 
week marketing period prior to the auction. The agent will generally include in the 
marketing material an estimate of the desired price, referred to as the guide or listing 
price. A number of issues arise with respect to the guide price. Firstly, it is not a 
binding commitment for either the vendor or the agent as to the final sale price. 
Secondly, it should be clearly noted that the listed price and the auction reserve are 
not one and the same. The guide price is merely the publicly available estimate of the 
value of the property as prepared by the agent/auction house. Effectively, the guide 
price is part of the marketing process for the property (Stevenson et al., 2010).  
 
The auctioneer will agree with the vendor, generally on the day of the auction, a 
reserve price that will be the minimum acceptable value which the seller will 
consider. The reserve is not disclosed prior to the auction and, as will be illustrated in 
this paper, it is generally higher than the advertised guide price. This is unlike the 
practice in counties such as Australia where the reservation price is usually made 
public (Lusht, 1994, 1996). In the context of this data, the reserve price is not 
necessarily at the level at which the auctioneer opens the bidding. The level of reserve 
will in part be influenced by the auctioneer’s assessment of the level of interest shown 
in the property during the marketing period. A factor that aids in the gauging of 
potential interest arises from the fact that successful bidders at auction are required to 
pay a non-refundable 10% deposit on the day of the auction and sign contracts 
agreeing that the sale be closed within six weeks of the auction date. In comparison, 
for negotiated private treaty sales the deposit is refundable up until the point when the 
contracts agreeing the sale are signed, which is typically 4 to 6 weeks after the price is 
agreed. Fees, commissions and transaction costs are however, identical for both sale 
methods. This means that it is imperative that potential purchasers undertake all 
necessary checks and surveys, both structural and legal, prior to the auction. It also 
means that financing arrangements need to be in place, particularly with respect to the 
10% deposit, at the date of the auction. However, this process allows the auctioneer to 
gauge interest in the property, both in terms of the number of potential bidders, their 
seriousness and the possible price obtainable at auction. As with most English outcry 
auctions, if the reserve price is not met, then the vendor has the option of withdrawing 
the property from the market, with custom in Ireland dictating that the right of first 
negotiation lies with the highest bidder.  
 The only point during the auction process when the reserve may be revealed is that on 
some occasions the auctioneer may declare that the property is ‘on-the-market’. 
Whilst this is not a legal requirement, in the majority of cases in our sample the 
auctioneer did declare that the property was ‘on-the-market’ at some point after 
bidding had exceeded the reserve. However, it was not necessarily exactly at the 
reserve price. In a number of cases bidding had risen substantially above the 
undisclosed reserve prior to this declaration.  
 
Prior to discussing the characteristics of the sample it is important to highlight two 
issues. Firstly, as previously noted, the majority of properties sold through auction in 
Ireland are at the higher end of the market. The second issue that requires noting is the 
sample period considered. The 1998-2002 period was one characterized by rapid 
upward movement of house prices (Stevenson, 2008). Previous papers, such as Mayer 
(1995), have illustrated the importance of controlling for market conditions. In the 
context of the current paper, whilst we do include time dummies in the specifications, 
there is less need to control for distinct market conditions. However, the results are 
indicative of a strong upward market and may not necessarily apply in the context of 
weaker market conditions. In addition, the broader comments of Mayer (1995) with 
respect to the optimality of auctions versus negotiated sales in boom markets needs to 
be taken into account. Whilst generally the model of Mayer (1995) argues in terms of 
the optimal nature of negotiated sales, he does note that it assumes that a seller cannot 
adjust the price in the face of two bidders willing to pay the guide price. Therefore, in 
strong upward markets, auctions may provide an opportunity to maximize revenue 
further as bidders can raise prices in excess of the guide price.  
 
With regard to property specific variables, data is available for the number of 
bedrooms, number of bathrooms and whether the property had parking facilities. In 
the absence of reliable square footage data, the bedroom and bathroom variables act 
as a proxy for the size of the property. In all of the tests conducted we control for the 
time of sale and the location and type of the property. Given the small sample it was 
not feasible to use time dummies at a greater frequency than annual. For location, the 
properties are divided into the Central City, South City, North City, South County and 
Periphery of Dublin. The Central City is defined by the postcodes (zip codes) D1, D2, 
D7 and D8. The remaining areas within the City of Dublin are divided based on the 
River Liffey into North and South. The use of even numbered postcodes south of the 
river and odd numbered ones north of the river makes this divide straightforward. 
South County Dublin contains all areas within the County of Dublin south of the 
River Liffey but not formally within the City of Dublin. The peripheral grouping 
contains all remaining areas in the County of Dublin and also those properties in 
neighboring countries that can viewed as part of the greater metropolitan area, 
including parts of Wicklow, Kildare, Meath and Louth. Property type variables are 
included for the following house types: detached, semi-detached house, bungalow 
(ranch), terrace/mews and apartment (condominium).  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample. Panel’s A through C display the 
average and median prices reported, whilst Panel D reports counts for the dummy 
variables used. Of the 389 properties analyzed, 198 successfully sold at auction whilst 
the remaining 191 were withdrawn. It can also be seen that the spread of the sample 
across property type is relatively even, with only the apartment sector seeing a small 
number of properties sold through auction (23). If one compares the breakdown to 
that in Stevenson et al. (2010) it is relatively similar. However, as one would possibly 
expect given that our sample is restricted to properties sold through auction, we 
observe a slightly higher proportion in detached houses, bungalows and apartments. 
In comparison, our sample has a slightly lower smaller representation from semi-
detached houses and terrace/mews properties. The location of properties is dominated 
by two key submarkets, namely South City and South County Dublin. These are the 
two most highly priced submarkets in Greater Dublin and confirm the comment made 
earlier that auctions were used primarily at the premium end of the market, 
particularly during the period covered in this sample. The dummy variables with 
respect to the location within the room and the auctioneer are defined as follows. In 
relation to the location of the winning bid, this is defined quite broadly as being at the 
front, center or rear of the room. For the auctioneer variable we have details on the 
individual person who conducted the auction. Three auctioneers conducted the 
majority of the proceedings and presided over far more auctions than others. These 
three auctioneers are denoted as 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The dummy variable 
Auctioneer 4 combines all remaining auctioneers.  
 
Table 1 also reports the main summary statistics from the data, whilst Table 2 details 
the average of the percentage differences across the different prices for the individual 
properties
8
. From the two tables it can be seen that not only was the average sale price 
achieved above the reserve, but that the reserve itself was on average higher than the 
guide price
9
. For those properties sold at auction for which complete information is 
available as shown in Panel C, the average guide price was €341,700. In contrast the 
average undisclosed reserve was €394,943.33 and the average sale price was 
€450,326.67. This highlights two issues. Firstly, it would appear that vendors and 
auction houses discounted the listing prices, possibly in order to attract additional 
participants to the auction, consistent with the findings of Stevenson et al., (2010). 
Secondly, the fact that sale prices are on average higher than the reserve would 
indicate that the auction process does add an element of value to the sale process.  
 
These effects can also be seen from the statistics displayed in Table 2 which reports 
the percentage differences across the guide, opening bid, reserve and sale prices. Here 
it can be clearly seen that on average the reserve was 15.15% above the guide price. 
Furthermore, in only four out of 240 cases was the reserve set below the guide. 
Indeed, the high proportion found here is repeated elsewhere. On average the 
achieved sale price was 14.18% above the reserve, with only six out of 150 
observations being negative, and 31.97% above the listing price, with only three 
negative observations. The fact that not only is the average sale price higher than the 
reserve but that a positive result is achieved in virtually all of the cases highlights the 
key difference between auction and private treaty sales noted earlier. Whilst the 
setting of the reserve higher than the guide may initially appear to be in line with the 
argument of Riley & Samuelson (1981) in that the optimal reserve should be higher 
than the vendors own valuation, it is important to remember that the guide is not 
necessarily a pure estimate of valuation. It is also of interest to consider the behavior 
of the auctioneers by looking at the opening bids. The auctioneer can open the bidding 
at any price and is not constrained by either the advertised listing price or the 
undisclosed reserve. Table 2 shows that on average auctioneers open the bidding 
6.59% below the advertised guide price, a figure equivalent to the reserve being 
24.48% higher. Indeed, this trend was followed with over 70% of the observations 
seeing the opening bid below the guide. In only four out of 199 observations was the 
bidding opened above the reserve. The overall finding was that the average 
percentage price movement from the opening bid to the sale price was in excess of 
40%
10
.  
 
 
4: Empirical Analysis 
4.1: The Probability of Sale 
The empirical analysis consists of two primary components. This first section 
involves an analysis of the probability of a successful sale, whilst the second 
examines and models the sale premiums
11
. To consider those features and 
characteristics of the auction process on the success of the auction, a probit model is 
estimated where the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of unity if 
the property was sold and zero otherwise. The model can be specified as follows: 
 
Outcome = f(baths, beds, parking, Type, Location, Time, attendance,  
bidders, bids, multiple, Auctioneer, Room, previous, order)   (1) 
 
The explanatory variables include a variety of both property specific factors and 
variables that specifically refer to the auction. In the above equation variables notated 
to in bold refer to groups of variables. The property specific variables include the 
number of bathrooms, bedrooms and a dummy indicating whether the property had 
parking facilities. Groups of dummies were included to capture the impact of property 
type, location and the year of sale. The base property was a bungalow, located in 
North City Dublin, sold in 2000. Whilst the importance of these would obviously 
impact upon both the listing and sale prices, papers such as DeBoer et al. (1992) and 
Ong et al. (2005) show that factors such as location can also impact upon the 
probability of sale. The auction variables included relate to the attendance at the 
auction, the number of bidders, the number of bids and whether multiple auctions 
were held that day. These variables obviously relate to the large literature discussed 
previously that has illustrated the importance of bidders in both obtaining higher 
prices at auction and leading to an increased probability of sale
12
. Ong et al. (2005) 
explicitly highlights the role of the number of the bidders with the turnout variable 
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in a probit model of 
Singaporean residential property auctions.  The detailed data utilized here allows for 
the inclusion of not only overall attendance figures but also the specific number of 
bids and bidders. Given the possible similarity between these two variables (bids and 
bidders) we checked the correlation between the two. However, we observe that it is 
only 0.44. When looking at the underlying data it is clear that a wide variety of 
circumstances do exist. These include extended auctions in terms of bids but where 
the auction is dominated by a small number of bidders, frequently only two. We also 
observe cases where the opposite occurs with a relatively large number of bidders 
entering a limited number of bids, often just one.  
 
In addition to the above variables, dummy variables relating to the auctioneer who 
presided over the sale, a dummy variable as to whether the previous auction that day 
had resulted in a sale and the ordering of the auction in the day were included. The 
information relating to the location of the winning bidder was grouped into categories 
of front, center, and rear with the front of room dummy excluded from the estimated 
model.  
 
The results from the model are reported in Table 3. Model I refers to the base 
specification. Models II, III and IV are augmented specifications that in addition to 
the core variables add the following. Model II includes the Guide Price. The rationale 
here is that a lower guide may lead to an increased probability of sale, an argument 
related to that used by Stevenson et al. (2010) with respect to agents using the listing 
price as a marketing tool. Model III includes the Reserve Price and also the 
percentage premium of the reserve over the guide. This relates to the large volume of 
literature concerning the role of the reserve in both having a positive impact upon 
revenue but likewise having a negative impact upon the likelihood of sale (Riley & 
Samuelson, 1981; McAfee & Vincent, 1992; Hu et al., 2010)
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specification, Model IV, includes the Opening Bid and the premium of the reserve 
over it.  
 
The results, reported in Table 3, provide empirical evidence to support a number of 
the theoretical arguments presented. As would be anticipated, the majority of the 
property specific variables are not significant. This is intuitive as the primary area 
where these variables come into play is in terms of the price. However, as with the 
Ong et al. (2005) study, we do find significant coefficients with respect to some of the 
location variables. It is shown in three of the four specifications that properties in the 
South City display a significantly greater probability of sale. Furthermore, properties 
in South County Dublin do likewise in Model IV. This illustrates that while the 
location obviously plays an important role in the price of the property, it also 
influences the success of the auction. Interestingly, the South City and South County 
of Dublin are the prime residential areas.  
 
In relation to the variables concerned with bids, all specifications report significant 
findings. The Number of Bids and the Number of Bidders both significantly increase 
the probability of sale in the first three models, whilst the number of bids is also 
significant in Model IV. This provides supporting evidence for the theoretical 
arguments relating to the importance of bidders. While Auction Attendance is not 
itself significant, the dummy variable relating to whether multiple sales took place is 
in all but Model IV. This would imply that attendance does perhaps play a role, 
although as noted previously the properties auctioned on the same day frequently 
displayed characteristics that were quite divergent. Interestingly, the dummy variable 
concerned with the winning bidder being in the center of the room was significant in 
two of the four models. In both Models II and III, this increased the probability of sale 
to a statistically significant extent. The augmented specifications all provide an 
element of significant findings. In Model II, the Guide Price is found to be 
significantly negative, implying that an increase in the listing price significantly 
reduces the probability of sale. It could be argued that it plays an important role, as 
implied by Stevenson et al. (2010), in the marketing of the property and the 
encouragement of participation in the auction. The general housing literature does 
find a parallel finding in that an increase in private treaty listing prices reduces the 
speed at which bids arrive and increases the time-on-the market (e.g. Haurin, 1988; 
Mayer, 1995; Genesove & Mayer, 1997; Merlo & Ortalo-Magne, 2004).  
 
Model III incorporates the Reserve Price into the specification
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key elements of this paper given the rarity at which information pertaining to 
undisclosed reserves is available for empirical testing. It was found that the reserve 
has a significant negative coefficient with respect to the probability of sale, albeit 
marginally. This provides a level of empirical support for the theoretical arguments 
put forth by Riley & Samuelson (1981), McAfee & Vincent (1992) and Hu et al. 
(2010). Ong et al. (2005) were forced to use a proxy for the reserve; however it did 
not result in significant findings. The final variables are the Reserve-to-Guide 
premium in Model III and the Opening Bid and Reserve-to-Opening Bid premium in 
Model IV. Whilst the percentage premium of the Reserve to Guide is negative it is not 
so at significant levels. Likewise, the Opening Bid is not statistically significant. It 
may be, in this case, that bidders are very aware that the opening bid provides limited 
information. As previously reported on average the opening bid was 6.59% lower than 
the advertised guide. Therefore, bidders may simply accept that the auctioneer will 
start the bidding at a low level in order to encourage initial bids. However, while the 
Opening Bid itself was not significant, the premium of the reserve over it was with a 
significant negative coefficient found. This is also intuitive as this measure captures 
the increase in the bidding necessary for the property to be sold. It also provides 
additional support for the previous results with respect to the negative relationship 
between the reserve and the likelihood of sale. While the initial coefficient concerning 
the reserve itself was only marginally significant at conventional levels, the premium 
of the reserve over and above the opening bid is highly significant, at a 99% level. 
 
 
4.2: Analysis of Sale Premiums 
The second element of the empirical analysis considers an analysis of the sale 
premiums. Percentage changes of the sale price relative to the opening bid, guide 
price and undisclosed reserve are analyzed in turn. The models are specified in a 
similar manner to those previously discussed, whilst the results are reported in Table 
4. 
 
Premium=f(baths, beds, parking, Type, Location, Time, attendance,  
bidders, bids, multiple, Auctioneer, Room, previous, order)   (2) 
 
Given the nature of the dependent variable in these cases, the interpretation of the 
findings has to be done so carefully, as the results may not necessarily imply a higher 
sale price obtained. For example, the findings with respect to auctioneer dummy 
variables are a case in point. In the analysis of the Sale-to-Opening Bid, Auctioneer 2 
and Auctioneer 3 are both negative and significant. Furthermore, Auctioneer 3 reports 
a significant positive coefficient when the Sale-to-Guide Price is modeled as does the 
Auctioneer 2 variable in the Sale-to-Reserve specification. With regard to the 
premium over the opening bid, these findings may simply imply that the second and 
third auctioneers tended to open the bidding at a higher price. It does not necessarily 
imply that they sold the properties for lower prices. Likewise, given that the 
auctioneer will be involved throughout the sale process and therefore have a role in 
the setting of the guide price, a similar interpretation could be lent to the second 
model. In this case a significant positive result was found with respect to Auctioneer 
3. This could imply that the third auctioneer tended towards a lower guide price, 
perhaps due to the previously evidenced role that the guide can play. Furthermore, 
this viewpoint would be consistent with a counter interpretation in the case of the 
third model. As the reserve price will be set by the auctioneer in conjunction with the 
vendor and will be the undisclosed minimum acceptable price to the seller, there is 
less room for this variable to be affected by the strategies adopted by the auctioneer. 
Therefore, the significant positive coefficient reported in relation to Auctioneer 2 
when the Sale-to-Reserve premium is modeled could be interpreted as an indication of 
the skill of the auctioneer in question in achieving a higher sale price specification.  
 
A number of other variables provide significant findings in the analysis of the sale 
premiums. It is of interest that in a number of cases property specific variables report 
significant coefficients. This is true of the Bedrooms (positive) and Semi-Detached 
(negative) variables in the modeling of the Sale-to-Opening Bid and the 
Terrace/Mews (negative), Detached (negative), South City (positive) when the Sale-
to-Guide premium is examined. Similarly with the auctioneers finding, the analysis of 
the results require carful interpretation. In some cases it may be that the auction 
process leads to a premium that can be attributed to certain characteristics. This may 
be true, for example, in terms of the positive coefficient for the South City. As seen 
from three of the probit model specifications this variable did have a significant 
positive effect on the likelihood of sale. However, it is interesting that no such 
property specific variables are significant in the case of the premium over the reserve 
price. Since the reserve price is the minimum acceptable price for the seller it may be 
that it is a more accurate measure of the anticipated price than either the opening bid 
or guide. In contrast, to varying degrees and in slightly different contexts, both the 
opening bid and guide prices are part of the auction process and may be adapted by 
the agent/auctioneer in order to encourage participation and bidding. Therefore, 
information other than that which reflects the ‘true’ estimated value of the property 
may be incorporated into them.  
 
A number of the year dummies are also significant in the various specifications. 
Specifically, 1999 is significantly positive when looking at the premium over the 
guide price, while a similar result is reported for 2002 when the reserve price is 
considered. Again these findings may reveal more about the base price rather than the 
achieved sale price. It may be that guide prices were underestimated in 1999, while 
sellers and auctioneers were similarly cautious with reserve prices in 2002. This 
explanation is somewhat intuitive given the market conditions in Ireland in this 
period. The fast rate of house price appreciation in the late nineties may have meant 
that despite the short time horizon under consideration here, the market was moving 
so fast in 1999 to give the impression of an exaggerated Sale-to-Guide premium. 
Likewise, the brief respite in the market that occurred in 2001 may have resulted in 
agents and sellers being more cautious in their assessment of achievable prices in 
2002
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One of the key elements across all three models is the role that bidders play in the 
auction process. For each specification both the Number of Bids and the Number of 
Bidders is positive and significant, supporting the existing literature in relation to the 
importance of participation. The results indicate that increased participation results in 
a significantly higher sale premium, irrespective of whether the base figure is the 
opening bid, guide price or reserve. In addition, when considering the Sale-Reserve 
premium, overall Auction Attendance is also positive and significant. On an 
associated point, the dummy relating to whether the previous auction that day had 
been successful was significant in the Sale-Reserve specification. This implies that 
behavioral elements may come into play and that a positive impact from the success, 
or otherwise, of previous auctions is an important element in achieving a premium.  
 
The final empirical results expand upon the analysis thus far presented to consider the 
impact a higher reserve has upon the sale price obtained. The specification utilizes the 
same variables as in the preceding analysis with the dependent variable modeled as 
the log of the sale price, for those properties successfully sold at auction. In addition 
to the variables used in the analysis of the sale-premiums, the premium of the reserve 
over and above the guide price was also added. The premium is estimated as the 
percentage difference between the undisclosed reserve with reference to the publicly 
disclosed guide price. The results from this model are displayed in Table 5. Prior to 
discussing the key variable of interest, it is worth noting some of broader findings. 
Given that the variable being modeled is the achieved price, it is not surprising that 
key determinants of house prices are achieving coefficients of statistically significant 
levels in this model. For example, the number of bedrooms, doubling as a proxy for 
property size, is positive and significant, as is the South City of Dublin dummy. The 
time dummies illustrated the strong upward movement in prices during the sample 
period. The significant positive coefficient with respect to Auctioneer 1 needs careful 
interpretation. While it would appear to initially imply that Auctioneer 1 displays 
enhanced skill in obtaining a higher sale price, it is more likely that the that the 
auctioneer in question tended to preside over those auctions involving the most highly 
valued properties
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In relation to the reserve over guide premium, a statistically significant positive 
coefficient was found. This would indicate that the higher the reserve price was, 
relative to the advertised guide, the higher the achieved sale price. This is consistent 
with the theoretical arguments presented in papers such as Riley & Samuelson (1981) 
and McAfee & Vincent (1992). As noted in the introduction, Riley & Samuelson 
(1981) argue that reserves will maximize revenue, whilst McAfee & Vincent (1992) 
note that that reserves should have a positive relationship with the sale price obtained. 
The results obtained previously with respect to the probability of sale, also support 
McAfee & Vincent (1992). Therefore, our findings support their notion that while a 
higher reserve may lead to an increased sale price, at the same time it will reduce the 
likelihood of sale. As previously mentioned, the rationale underpinning this argument 
is that if the vendor imposes a higher minimum price, then proceeds from any sale 
will be enhanced. However, at the same time a higher reserve will reduce the 
likelihood of the vendor receiving a bid of an acceptable level, reducing the 
probability of sale.  
 
 
5: Conclusion 
One of the common problems that the empirical literature on auctions has encountered 
is the unavailability of key elements of data. In particular, information concerning 
issues such as the number of bids/bidders and the undisclosed reserve price is often 
not available, leading to either the exclusion of this variable from empirical work or 
the use of proxies. This problem has also led to a disparity between the rich vein of 
theoretical auction papers and the relatively limited number of empirical studies in the 
field. This paper has an advantage in that the data set available provides a rich vein of 
information relating to the auction process. The results reported are broadly 
supportive of the theoretical auction literature. The impact of the undisclosed reserve 
plays an important role with evidence that while it may increase the revenue obtained 
from the auction, a higher reserve also reduces the probability of sale. Throughout the 
analysis, the role of auction participation is highlighted in the findings that the number 
of bidders/bids is generally significant not only in the probability of sale at auction but 
also with respect to premium of the sale price achieved.  
 
There are however, a number of issues and areas of interest that we do not consider. 
One important element that we do not currently examine is that of optimal reserve 
prices. Given the availability of the actual reserve prices, a comparison between those 
and theoretically optimal ones would be of great interest. This is an area that the 
authors are currently considering. A further area where this research is being 
expanded upon relates to the bids. The current paper solely considers the number of 
bids and bidders. However, the data does allow an empirical consideration of the bid 
sequencing. Given the different nature of housing auctions compared to arenas such 
as online internet auctions this provides an interesting line of inquiry.  
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The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Sale Price 453,044 358,000 117,100 2,750,000 307,445 275 
Guide Price 418,679 330,000 85,000 3,200,000 303,525 389 
Reserve Price 424,724 340,000 100,000 2,200,000 278,777 239 
Withdrawn Price 498,388 350,000 110,000 3,200,000 422,235 85 
Number in 
Attendance 20.93 
14 
0 
70 18.26 
389 
Number of Bids 12.67 9 0 88 14.16 389 
Number of Bidders 2.21 2 0 10 2.07 389 
No. of Auctions  2.03 2 1 7 1.28 389 
Bathrooms 3.79 4 1 5 0.83 389 
Bedrooms 1.73 1.50 1 8 1.13 389 
Panel B: Properties Sold at Auction 
Sale Price 462,437 364,500 133,000 2,750,000 312,829 198 
Guide Price 353,914 290,000 85,000 2,000,000 232,870 198 
Reserve Price 394,493 325,000 100,000 2,200,000 278,927 150 
Panel C: Properties Sold at Auction for Whom Reserve Available 
Sale Price 450,327 359,000 133,000 2,750,000 328,450 150 
Guide Price 341,700 280,000 85,000 2,000,000 238,185 150 
Reserve Price 394,493 325,000 100,000 2,200,000 278,927 150 
Panel D: Counts for Dummy Variables 
Sold at Auction 198 Parking 123  
Withdrawn then Sold 77 Apartment 23  
Withdrawn Unsold 114 Terrace/Mews 103  
No Bids 106 Semi-Detached 91  
Multiple Auctions 268 Detached 105  
Front of Room 43 Bungalow 67  
Centre of Room 97 Central Dublin 25  
Back of Room 114 North City 45  
Auctioneer 1 85 South City 155  
Auctioneer 2 111 South County Dublin 128  
Auctioneer 3 127 Periphery 36  
Auctioneer 4 66     
Notes: Table 1 reports summary statistics for some of the key variables. The summary statistics are 
reported on the basis of the overall sample, for those properties that sold at auction and, in Panel C, for 
those sold properties for whom all data was available. Panel D displays the number of observations of 
unity reported for each of the dummy variables used throughout the empirical analysis. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Price Premiums 
 
Reserve-Open Reserve-Guide Open-Guide Sale-Reserve Sale-Open Sale-Guide 
Average 24.48% 15.15% -6.59% 14.18% 40.60% 31.97% 
Count 199 240 283 150 198 198 
No. Positive 193 227 38 143 197 195 
No. Zero 2 9 45 1 1 0 
No .Negative 4 4 200 6 0 3 
Maximum 125.00% 141.67% 108.33% 65.22% 140.00% 192.50% 
Minimum -10.00% -9.91% -60.00% -14.67% 0.00% -53.33% 
Notes: Table 2 provides information on the average percentage differences between the various prices 
used in the study.  
 
 
Table 3: Probit Models Examining the Probability of Sale 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic 
Constant -4.2435 -4.5097*** 1.2736 2.4067** 4.1290 0.6818 2.5740 0.3897 
Bathrooms 0.1622 1.0037 0.0196 0.7942 0.1893 0.7096 0.2487 0.8355 
Bedrooms 0.0097 0.0726 0.0327 1.5193 0.3577 1.5831 0.2732 1.1069 
Parking 0.4678 1.5976 0.0319 0.8506 0.6590 1.4684 0.6585 1.3012 
Apartment -0.3052 -0.4509 -0.0272 -0.3265 -0.6292 -0.6597 -0.8021 -0.7791 
Terrace/Mews 0.2216 0.4652 0.0324 0.5828 0.1428 0.2025 0.2336 0.3112 
Semi-Detached 0.0088 0.0201 -0.0008 -0.0151 -0.3354 -0.5239 -0.0969 -0.1433 
Detached 0.1290 0.3138 0.0289 0.5391 0.3142 0.4718 0.5955 0.8437 
Central Dublin 0.8783 1.2731 0.0974 1.1369 1.0496 1.1735 0.9965 0.9956 
South City 0.7793 1.7601* 0.0568 1.0299 1.1852 2.1291** 1.2726 2.0674** 
South County Dublin 0.6856 1.5434 0.0339 0.5992 1.0778 1.8530* 1.1084 1.6833* 
Periphery 0.8826 1.5610 0.0414 0.5549 0.4996 0.6175 0.6364 0.7292 
1998 0.5080 1.2985 -0.0286 -0.5201 0.8064 1.3133 1.0925 1.7281* 
1999 0.0517 0.1380 -0.0553 -1.0837 0.2129 0.3888 -0.0937 -0.1575 
2001 0.3108 0.6068 0.0181 0.2692 0.5702 0.6799 0.3054 0.3483 
2002 0.7888 1.4152 0.0850 1.1461 1.2889 1.3700 1.2744 1.0941 
Auction Attendance 0.0008 0.1080 -0.0003 -0.3007 0.0073 0.7230 0.0007 0.0598 
Number of Bidders 0.2775 1.9106* 0.0971 7.2227*** 0.5132 2.4609** 0.3829 1.6177 
Number of Bids 0.1709 6.1232*** 0.0143 7.9551*** 0.1648 4.8812*** 0.1736 4.7473*** 
Multiple Auctions 0.7947 2.3768** 0.0829 1.9327* 0.8034 1.9109* 0.6785 1.5147 
Auctioneer 1 -0.4724 -1.1348 -0.0064 -0.1151 -0.3096 -0.4230 -0.3706 -0.4767 
Auctioneer 2 -0.4176 -1.0044 -0.0364 -0.6946 -0.2713 -0.3995 -0.5334 -0.7374 
Auctioneer 3 -0.1709 -0.3736 -0.0250 -0.4461 0.5002 0.6421 0.0445 0.0537 
Centre of Room 0.3961 1.5913 0.0755 2.1630** 0.7782 2.2189** 0.3465 0.7972 
Rear of Room -0.0978 -0.3667 0.0160 0.4326 -0.0415 -0.1132 0.0633 0.1495 
Previous Auction Sold -0.0988 -0.2640 -0.0145 -0.2981 -0.0145 -0.0265 -0.1037 -0.1588 
Order of Auction 0.0569 0.1622 -0.0143 -0.3138 0.4532 0.9244 0.7418 1.1650 
Guide Price - - -0.1128 -2.6032*** - - - - 
Reserve Price - - - - -0.8779 -1.6468* - - 
Reserve-Guide (%) - - - - -1.2759 -0.9930 - - 
Opening Bid - - - - - - -0.6327 -1.0724 
Reserve-Opening Bid (%) - - - - - - -3.7565 -3.2473*** 
McFadden R2  0.7261  0.6397  0.7151  0.6629  
Observations 389  389  239  199  
Notes: Four alternative specifications of a Binary Probit model are estimated where the dependent variable in a binary variable. It takes the value of unity if the property sold 
at auction and zero otherwise. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Table 4: Sale Premiums on Properties Sold at Auction 
 Sale-Open Bid (%) Sale-Guide (%) Sale-Reserve (%) 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic 
Constant 0.1122 0.0912 1.2297 0.0772 0.0972 0.7945 -0.1154 0.0595 -1.9394* 
Bathrooms -0.0116 0.0192 -0.6054 -0.0210 0.0204 -1.0247 -0.0199 0.0122 -1.6286 
Bedrooms 0.0279 0.0146 1.9146* -0.0074 0.0155 -0.4736 0.0141 0.0094 1.5033 
Parking -0.0069 0.0288 -0.2381 -0.0483 0.0307 -1.5724 -0.0060 0.0187 -0.3233 
Apartment -0.0383 0.0687 -0.5572 0.0707 0.0731 0.9669 0.0531 0.0436 1.2195 
Terrace/Mews -0.0583 0.0431 -1.3543 -0.0875 0.0459 -1.9075* 0.0079 0.0276 0.2876 
Semi-Detached -0.0675 0.0404 -1.6707* -0.0686 0.0431 -1.5935 -0.0288 0.0269 -1.0734 
Detached -0.0165 0.0425 -0.3877 -0.0755 0.0453 -1.6693* 0.0202 0.0293 0.6873 
Central Dublin 0.7031 0.0658 1.0690 0.0167 0.0700 0.2385 -0.0605 0.0410 -1.4759 
South City 0.0330 0.0402 0.8220 0.0851 0.0428 1.9878** -0.0220 0.0237 -0.9256 
South County Dublin -0.1892 0.0431 -0.4392 0.0587 0.0459 1.2801 -0.0096 0.0255 -0.3769 
Periphery -0.0412 0.0603 -0.6826 -0.0356 0.0643 -0.5545 -0.0332 0.0384 -0.8634 
1998 0.0392 0.0402 0.9753 0.0182 0.0428 0.4247 0.0071 0.0289 0.2460 
1999 0.0199 0.0420 0.4735 0.1042 0.0447 2.3319** 0.0369 0.0289 1.2792 
2001 0.0689 0.0610 1.1301 0.0297 0.0650 0.4579 0.0592 0.0425 1..3929 
2002 0.0296 0.0527 0.5615 0.0800 0.0561 1.4259 0.1003 0.0382 2.6258*** 
Auction Attendance 0.0015 0.0008 1.9521* -0.0004 0.0008 -0.5121 0.0010 0.0005 2.1505** 
Number of Bidders 0.0267 0.0093 2.8814*** 0.0223 0.0099 2.2667** 0.0242 0.0062 3.9187*** 
Number of Bids 0.0059 0.0011 5.2421*** 0.0065 0.0012 5.3766*** 0.0035 0.0007 5.2700*** 
Multiple Auctions 0.0037 0.0335 0.1099 0.0167 0.0357 0.4677 -0.0058 0.0209 -0.2790 
Auctioneer 1 -0.0041 0.0436 -0.0930 0.0499 0.0465 1.0736 0.0388 0.0289 1.3427 
Auctioneer 2 -0.1246 0.0405 -3.0794*** 0.0305 0.0431 0.7088 0.0552 0.0251 2.2007** 
Auctioneer 3 -0.0911 0.0425 -2.1443*** 0.0873 0.0453 1.9292* 0.0228 0.0283 0.8052 
Previous Auction Sold 0.0145 0.0385 0.3776 0.0665 0.0410 1.6200 0.0628 0.0240 2.6169*** 
Order of Auction -0.0247 0.0350 -0.7056 -0.0318 0.0372 -0.8550 -0.0473 0.0212 -2.2326** 
R
2
 adjusted 0.2956   0.3159   0.4342   
Observations 198   198   150   
Notes: Three alternative OLS models are estimated with the percentage change of the sale price over the opening bid, guide and reserve price. * indicates significance at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 5: Hedonic Model of Sale Price 
 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic 
Constant 11.7933 0.2501 47.1544*** 
Reserve-Guide Premium 0.4773 0.2230 2.1401** 
Bathrooms 0.0773 0.0500 1.5471 
Bedrooms 0.2022 0.0389 5.1952*** 
Parking 0.0240 0.0772 0.3112 
Apartment -0.0561 0.1785 -0.3141 
Terrace/Mews -0.1823 0.1156 -1.5769 
Semi-Detached -0.1112 0.1105 -1.0063 
Detached 0.1572 0.1222 1.2866 
Central Dublin 0.2116 0.1686 1.2551 
South City 0.2168 0.1001 2.1660** 
South County Dublin 0.0672 0.1058 0.6353 
Periphery 0.1106 0.1574 0.7029 
1998 -0.4926 0.1184 -4.1602*** 
1999 -0.2458 0.1183 -2.0784** 
2001 0.3589 0.1741 2.0615** 
2002 0.4445 0.1573 2.8267*** 
Auction Attendance 0.0009 0.0019 0.4796 
Number of Bidders 0.0359 0.0253 1.4166 
Number of Bids 0.0003 0.0028 0.1229 
Multiple Auctions 0.0011 0.0857 0.0127 
Auctioneer 1 0.2863 0.1182 2.4223** 
Auctioneer 2 0.0288 0.1029 0.2793 
Auctioneer 3 0.0619 0.1162 0.5332 
Previous Auction Sold 0.0440 0.0983 0.4479 
Order of Auction 0.0134 0.0869 0.1539 
R
2
 adjusted 0.5626   
Observations 198   
Notes: A hedonic model is estimated with the dependent variable being the log of the sale price 
achieved. The observations included in this specification are solely those properties that were 
successfully sold at auction. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 See also papers such as Maskin & Riley (1984), Waehrer et al. (1998) and Haile & Tamer 
(2003) with respect to the issue of risk aversion and the setting of optimal reserve prices. 
2
 This proxy was not adopted in the current study for three primary reasons. Firstly, the 
undisclosed reserve was available. Secondly, the current lack of a comparable sample of pure 
private treaty sales limits the ability to provide an estimate of market value. Finally, the 
opening bid, as we will see, bears limited relation to the valuation of the property.  
3
 There is in addition a general literature that has examined the bidding process and how the 
arrival of bids can influence the outcome of an auction. The development of online auctions 
has led to a large number of papers to have considered such issues in recent years (e.g. Bajari 
& Hortacsu, 2003, 2004; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002; Wang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2011) 
4
 On a more general note Chow et al. (2011) also support the previously cited work relating to 
the importance of market conditions and that auctions are more likely to outperform during 
periods of strong house price appreciation. 
5
 See also papers such as Yavas (1992), Sirmans & Turnbull (1993), Chen & Rosenthal 
(1996a, 1996b), Springer (1996), Knight et al. (1998), Arnold (1999), Taylor (1999), Knight 
(2002), Anglin et al. (2003). 
6
 Part of the conditions agreed to when obtaining the data was that the auction house remain 
anonymous. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the data meant that no data after 2002 was 
released. 
7
 All of the properties sold through auction were done so with an undisclosed reserve. For 
those properties for which this information was not available it is simply that the information 
was not recorded in the auction book. This is why when we include the reserve as a variable 
in any of the empirical models we do so with a curtailed sample. 
8
 The withdrawn price data only uses information from those auctions where there was actual 
bidding. In a large number of cases properties were withdrawn after no bidding. Hence in 
those cases we have no actual withdrawn price or an opening bid. Indeed, the only reliable 
prices are the listing price and the reserve where available.  
9
 Note that whilst prices were denominated in Irish Pounds prior to the introduction of the 
coinage of the Euro in January 2002 all prices used in the study are quoted in Euro’s. 
10
 On a more general setting Yavas et al. (2001) consider the role of opening bids in the 
context of negotiated sales. This experimental paper includes initial opening bids from both 
the buyer and seller. 
11
 For a broad consideration of alternative methodological frameworks adopted in the auction 
literature see Paarsch & Han (2006). Some of this literature has specifically considered the 
examination of auction bidding when the number of bidders is unknown (e.g. An et al., 2010; 
Guerre et al., 2000; Li et al, 2002; Hendricks et al., 2003). We do however have the benefit of 
knowing this information. This does make the empirical modelling easier and illustrates the 
richness of the data available.  
12
 In addition to the previously cited papers such as Vickrey (1961), Holt (1979), Harris & 
Raviv (1981) and McAfee & McMillan (1987) in relation to the theoretical arguments as to 
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the role of bids in auction prices, see also to more recent papers such as Mayer (1995) and 
Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003).  
13
 As previously noted there is a similar argument relating to the setting of list prices with 
respect to negotiated sales in housing. See for example Haurin (1988), Mayer (1995), 
Genesove & Mayer (1997) and Merlo & Ortalo-Magne (2004). 
14
 The examination of the reserve relates purely to the presence of one and its level. As noted 
previously, all of the properties have a reserve price that is undisclosed. Any indirect 
disclosure by the auctioneer is, as previously stated, at their discretion not the vendor’s and 
does not necessarily occur at the point at which the reserve is exceeded.  
15
 See Stevenson (2008) for a broader discussion of market conditions in the Irish market 
during this period. 
16
 Informal inquiries would confirm this. The person in question was the senior auctioneer and 
was more likely to preside over highly valued properties.  
